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Electing Not to Fight: Elections as a Mechanism of 
Deradicalisation after the Irish Civil War 1922–1938
Bill Kissane, Department of Government, London School of Economics, United Kingdom
Much research into the relationship between democratisation and conflict argues that holding elections soon after civil war, when nationalist issues still reson-
ate, is likely to see voters elect to fight. This paper explores a case where elections had the opposite effect. Examination of the relationship between election re-
sults and political developments, as well as geographical voting patterns, demonstrates that elections were the primary mechanism for the deradicalisation of 
Irish politics after the civil war of 1922–23. Elections served as a mechanism for arbitration, selection, and coordination between more and less radical elites 
and their bases of support. Once the new state had shown its strength it had to accommodate gradual change, while electoral losers had to show they could 
reconcile change with stability. Elections helped establish credibility in both respects without altering the state-society relationship, suggesting that deradical-
isation was dependent on state performance, and thus on some shared conception of the state. This combination of credibility, electoral legitimacy, and state 
performance, enabled a revolutionary elite, schooled in both constitutional and revolutionary politics, to deradicalise Irish nationalism after independence.
The idea that the early stages of democratic transition can 
be hijacked by nationalist elites and result in people “elec-
ting to fight” is a useful corrective to the view that demo-
cratisation always brings peace. Transitional elections may 
enable elites to entrench their positions, and nationalism 
is the ideology which enables them do so (Snyder 2000; 
Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005). Although institutions 
such as a free press may constrain elites, early elections are 
likely to see people elect to fight by choosing leaders who 
advocate radical policies. Post-conflict elections particu -
larly can re-ignite civil war passions, give a platform to ex-
tremists, and allow one side to confirm its victory, 
obstructing general reconciliation (Reilly 2008). Early 
elections can be especially damaging if power becomes 
distributed along lines over which the war was fought, 
rather than leading to the integration necessary for state-
building (Sisk 2009, 198). Accordingly, Paris suggests that 
elections be postponed until moderates prevail, and elec-
toral systems designed to marginalise radicals (Paris 2004, 
188–91).
In Ireland, however, elections brought the War of Indepen-
dence (1919–1921) to a close, and enabled a state to de-
radicalise after its birth in civil war in 1922. Although these 
elections did confirm victories, expressed civil war tensions, 
and kept nationalist elites in power, politics substantially de-
radicalised nonetheless. Many democratic theorists under-
stand democratic institutions principally in terms of 
functions and outputs, not ideals. Irish elections proved to be 
a “mechanism” of deradicalisation in two ways: while at first 
seen as a way of achieving civil war ends, repeated exposure 
to this mechanism led to consensus on its value as a means of 
resolving conflict. It worked not because the two sides agreed 
to resolve their differences peacefully, but because it acceler-
ated a process of deradicalisation that led to the marginali-
sation of violent actors and consensus on democratic politics.
The author would like to thank Samer Abdelnour 
for his research assistance on this paper.
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1. Electing Not to Fight
If electing to fight is important, so should its converse be. If 
elections result in radicalisation when elites exploit us-versus-
them sentiments, represent their opponents as traitors, and 
harness electoral support in defence of privileges (Snyder 
2000, 45–88), a nationalist movement which possessed these 
combustible elements, but still deradicalised, suggests other 
possibilities. The Irish Free State was created by the Anglo-
Irish Treaty of 1921, after partition in 1920, and only became 
a republic in 1949. If the hardest struggles are those against 
the “birth defects” of a political community (Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005, 3), the deradicalisation of a state whose very 
existence constituted a violation of the founders’ principles 
shows that voting can also lead to non-violence.
Sinn Féin rose to prominence in 1918 when radicalisation 
seemed the best way of achieving independence. The move-
ment abstained from the United Kingdom’s Westminster 
parliament, founded its own underground parliament, Dáil 
Éireann, in January 1919, and committed itself to the Irish 
Republic proclaimed during the 1916 Rising. The War of In-
dependence lasted until July 1921, and the Rising remained 
a symbol of what could be achieved by physical force. The 
Irish Republican Army (IRA hereafter) spearheaded the in-
dependence movement. However, once the 1921 Anglo-Irish 
Treaty had been accepted by the second Dáil, on January 7, 
1922, elections became the crucial mechanism making the 
nationalist elite accountable to a public which had become 
war-weary. The Rising had seen “specialists in violence” in-
creasingly take the initiative away from the politicians. The 
treaty, however, split the IRA, and began a long process in 
which elected governments re-asserted their authority. Just 
as Sinn Féin invoked the principle of majority rule in 1918 
to back its call for independence, electoral victories were fol-
lowed by the forceful assertion of this principle in 1923, 
1927, 1933, and 1939. While 1918 radicalised politics, elec-
tions had the opposite effect after the treaty.
Deradicalisation involved a “painful confusing metamor-
phosis” for many revolutionaries (Garvin 1997). Since 
1916 nationalists had combined conventional with trans-
gressive politics. By ending the civil war in prison camps in 
1923, the anti-treaty elite had shown their loyalty to Re-
publicanism, but they themselves marginalised transgress-
ive politics after they formed the Fianna Fáil party in 1926. 
Elections were their primary mechanism for doing so, but 
the state’s foundation myth remained 1916. While the Ris-
ing had been a classic example of radical actors taking the 
initiative away from the politicians it remained, ironically, 
the foundation myth for a state whose stability rested on 
the marginalisation of the style of politics it established. 
The deradicalisation of behaviour did not extend to values. 
After “four glorious years” of revolution, deradicalisation 
was an unlikely source of national pride (Hogan 1954).
Deradicalisation had four dimensions. The commitment to 
the Republic was de-intensified, and the state stabilised in 
the 1930s, without achieving either the Republic or an end to 
partition. The treaty required these goals to be pursued in-
crementally, and the “all or nothing” Republican approach 
to “the national question” was sidelined. Secondly, conflicts 
were increasingly resolved in the formal representative arena. 
Differences over the Treaty split the second Dáil, and two 
rival parliaments continued to exist in parallel. The decision 
of Fianna Fáil to enter the new state’s “third Dáil” in 1927 
made it the only chamber which mattered. The all-Ireland 
second Dáil stopped meeting in 1938. Thirdly, the blurred 
boundary between constitutional and violent politics was 
reasserted, and elections became the only basis of legitimate 
authority in nationalist politics by 1933. Paramilitarism then 
declined. Finally, politics were deradicalised in the sense that 
a revolutionary elite became dependent on the support of an 
electorate less radical in its outlook. This meant that purely 
ideological parties did not flourish, and economic issues in-
creasingly dominated electoral campaigns.
Democratisation had resulted in a combination of inde-
pendence war, civil war, and sectarian war after 1918 (Kiss-
ane 2004). Yet the British imposition of the Treaty, and the 
fact that attacks on Northern Ireland would result in 
further violence against Catholics there, meant that the 
War of Independence could only be extended to Northern 
Ireland at a price. In this combustible environment “south-
ern Irish” voters elected not to fight. The June 1922 elec-
tion saw radical nationalists lose majority support, which 
meant that the costs of further conflict could not be easily 
be imposed on the voters. The link between elections and 
deradicalisation, thus established, would endure.
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Mansfield and Snyder also suggest that radical elites can 
be held in check by strong institutions of accountability 
(2003, 23). Irish voters’ decision not to fight in 1922 has 
been explained in three ways: (1) The sequence was one of 
institutionalisation before liberalisation. The British left 
the “building blocks” of normal politics: a central ad-
ministration, legal system, and free press. The breakdown 
of constitutionalism in 1916 was an aberration, 1922–23 a 
reassertion of the Irish norm. (2) Institutions such as the 
Catholic Church, the labour movement, and the press 
were sufficiently developed for the movement’s radicals to 
be reined in by the organised expression of public 
opinion (Garvin 1996; Laffan 1999); an accountabiliy ar-
gument. (3) A combination of British military pressure, 
the Catholic Church, and the stance of the banks dis-
torted the marketplace of ideas in 1922. (The first anti-
treaty newspaper, The Irish Press, was not founded until 
1931). Only the holding of successive elections, without 
threats of reoccupation, sanctions, and red scares, allowed 
the real views of the people to be ascertained. Sovereignty 
was a pre-requisite for the electorate expressing itself 
freely (a state-building argument). All three perspectives 
suggest that transitions do not necessarily create con-
ditions especially favourable for radical nationalist causes 
(Snyder 2000, 54).
2. “Civil War Politics”
“Civil war politics” – the term for the heated electoral cam-
paigns after 1922 – retained all the combustible elements of 
“electing to fight”. Yet elections continued to deradicalise. 
The civil war was fought within Sinn Féin and the IRA. The 
pro-treaty government prevailed and formed Cumann na 
nGaedheal in December 1922. The losers continued to be 
represented by Sinn Féin, from which Fianna Fáil split in 
1926. Cumann na nGaedheal ruled until 1932, after which 
Fianna Fáil remained in power for sixteen years. Civil war 
politics continued in two ways. No coalition was formed 
before 1948, which meant that the non-civil war parties 
played no role in government. Secondly, civil war issues 
were revisited at each election. Up to 1932 the government 
wanted elections to confirm its victory, while the opposi-
tion used elections to stake its claim as guardian of the in-
complete national revolution. Both sides thus struggled for 
legitimacy in the name of the nation.
Figure 1: Vote share of civil war and other parties 1922–38
Note: General elections were held in June and September 1927.
Source: Gallagher 1993.
The civil war divide became more, not less, important. The 
“directional model” of voting behaviour (Dunleavy 1995, 
150–52) suggests that once a basic line of division is estab-
lished in a political system, voters tend to vote in terms of 
what side of the divide they are on, not in terms of how 
closely their opinions match those of the parties them-
selves. In this respect voting is not rational but directional, 
and the parties that situate themselves most clearly on 
either side of the middle ground tend to attract most votes. 
Despite strong support for “neutral” candidates in June 
1922, once the two large parties representing the civil war 
sides emerged, voting became directional. As a result, the 
non-civil war parties’ share of the vote dropped from over 
40 percent in June 1922 to less than 15 percent in 1938. 
This decline is shown in red in Table 1. The September 
1927 election was the obvious turning-point.
Radicalisation may thrive when nationalist elites rule in the 
name of the people, but are insufficiently accountable to 
them (Snyder 2000, 45). Yet the civil war parties did impose 
their conception of politics on voters. They usually fell 
short of a majority during elections, but to avoid coalitions 
with “sectional interests” they took advantage of an am-
biguity in the 1922 constitution which did not outline the 
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conditions under which a Dáil could be dissolved, except to 
say that “Dáil Éireann may not at any time be dissolved ex-
cept on the advice of the Executive Council”. The first dis-
solution occurred in 1927, when the attorney general 
advised the minority government, which had done badly in 
the June election, that the Constitution did not prevent the 
Executive Council from dissolving the Dáil without its con-
sent (O’Leary 1979, 24). The Dáil was dissolved and the 
September 1927 “snap election” returned Cumann na 
nGaedheal to power. In 1933 and 1938 Fianna Fáil govern-
ments also called “snap elections” in order to convert their 
initial plurality of seats in the Dáil into a majority. They 
then formed a single-party government and avoided a co-
alition. Figure 2 shows the effects of these “snap elections” 
on parliamentary strengths.
gests the instrumental use to which civil war memories 
were put. The scars were real: seventy-seven IRA men were 
officially executed by the state during the civil war, most as 
reprisals. Yet “joint institutional manipulation”, whereby 
both sides used the rules of the game to structure com-
petition around themselves, took place (Dunleavy 1991). 
By 1936 forty-eight of the eighty-three articles of the 1922 
constitution had been amended, further concentrating 
power in the hands of the civil war parties (Farrell 1988).
Deradicalisation thus occurred more because the civil war 
blocs changed internally, rather than because moderate ac-
tors became more pivotal. Institutions, such as a free press 
or a multi-party system, were not strong enough to per-
suade voters that vertical divisions (between elites and 
masses) were more important than those between nations 
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 2). The combined electoral 
strength of the civil war parties was initially greatest in 
western areas where civil war violence was worst. Figure 3 
shows their combined first preference vote by region be-
tween 1922 and 1938. Before September 1927, their share 
of the vote in the “heartland” of Ireland and in the capital 
Dublin was actually less than 60 percent. Remarkably, in 
the heartland, where most constituencies were located, 
their share of the vote had dropped to only 43 percent by 
June 1927. This area had seen less fighting in 1922–23. 
After Fianna Fail’s entry into the Dáil in 1927 a national 
pattern of representation emerged, with the civil war par-
ties’ combined vote share reaching 80 percent or more in 
all regions in 1938. Their territorial expansion was an as-
pect of “the invasion of the centre by the periphery” be-
tween 1922 and 1938 (Garvin 1974). The third parties lost 
out in this invasion.
Figure 2: Party strengths and snap elections 1922–38
Source: Gallagher 1993.
Much has been written about what kinds of institutional 
design encourage deradicalisation. Power-sharing is often 
recommended. Irish politics deradicalised under a West-
minster “winner take all” system where power was ex-
clusively in the hands of one or other of the civil war 
parties. Local government was placed under strong central 
control after 1923. The term “Civil war politics” itself sug-
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Figure 3: Civil war parties’ share of first preference vote by region 1922–38 ficient mechanism for deradicalisation. They did so be-
cause they performed three essential functions.
3. Functions of Elections: Arbitration, Coordination, Selection
3.1 Elections as an Arbitration Mechanism
Elections can strengthen public support for democracy in 
new democracies if a process of “habituation” can lead to 
the internalisation of democratic rules. They can also 
strengthen the power of “norm entrepreneurs” who ad-
vocate democratic methods within political movements di-
vided between radicals and moderates. Irish involvement in 
mass elections long predated 1921 and its long democratic 
“apprenticeship” is usually cited as a reason for its stability 
(Chubb 1992). When the single transferable vote propor-
tional representation system was introduced in 1921, there 
was little difficulty adapting to it. On the other hand, others 
stress that belief in elections was reinforced by a dramatic 
alternation in power (Munger 1979). The 1932 changeover 
demonstrated that democratic rules applied to both sides.
Neither approach explains the relationship between elec-
tions and deradicalisation. In the absence of a negotiated 
peace and power-sharing, why should either side accept 
election results? The winners held an election to rubber-
stamp their victory in 1923, but why accept defeat in 1932? 
The role of “norm entrepreneurs” in persuading the losers 
to accept election results and the strengthening of state 
legitimacy in 1932 were important factors. But why were 
the norm entrepreneurs persuasive among the anti-
treatyites, and why did a “winner take all” changeover not 
disrupt the process? Post-civil war democracies must com-
bine respect for political pluralism with the provision of 
public order. If elections perpetuated the winner-take-all 
logic of civil war, how did they allow for the restoration of 
order?
One explanation is that both sides eventually accepted that 
the treaty issues should be arbitrated by the voting public. 
The question was not whether such issues should be domi-
nant, but whether they would be arbitrated democratically. 
Post-civil war democracy can be “an arbitration mech-
anism” in which the public are given the right to choose 
between warring factions in elections (Wanthchekon 2004). 
The treaty had required that a general election take place 
Note 1: To account for boundary revisions in 1923 and 1935, the following classifications were 
used. In 1922 Centre includes Dublin Mid, Dublin North West, Dublin South, Dublin County; 
 Heartland includes Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork Borough, Cork East and North East, Cork Mid, North, 
South, South East, and West, Kildare-Wicklow, Laois-Offaly, Louth-Meath, Tipperary North, South, 
and Mid, Waterford-Tipperary East, Wexford; Border Periphery includes Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim-
Roscommon North, Longford-Westmeath, Monaghan, Sligo-Mayo East; Western Periphery inclu-
des Clare, Galway, Kerry-Limerick West, Limerick City and East, Mayo South-Roscommon South, 
Mayo North and West. In 1923–33 Centre includes Dublin North, Dublin South, Dublin Co.; 
 Heartland includes Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork Borough, Cork East, Cork North, Cork West, Kildare, 
Laois-Offaly, Meath, Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford, Wicklow; Border Periphery includes Cavan, 
Donegal, Leitrim-Sligo, Longford-Westmeath, Louth, Monaghan, and Roscommon; Western Peri-
phery includes Clare, Galway, Kerry, Limerick, Mayo North, and Mayo South. For 1937–38 Centre 
includes Dublin North East, Dublin North West, Dublin South, Dublin Townships, Dublin County; 
Heartland includes Carlow-Kildare, Cork Borough, Cork North, Cork South East, Cork West, Kilken-
ny Laois Offaly, Meath-Westmeath, Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford, and Wicklow; Border Periphery 
includes Athlone-Longford, Cavan, Donegal East, Donegal West, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, Ros-
common, Sligo; Western Periphery includes Clare, Galway East, Galway West, Kerry North, Kerry 
South, Limerick, Mayo North, and Mayo South.
Note 2: In 1922 Limerick City and East, Donegal, Leitrim-Roscommon North, Clare, Kerry-Lime-
rick-West, and Mayo North and West were uncontested.
Note 3: Figures for University constituencies are not included.
Hence deradicalisation cannot be explained in terms of the 
weakening of the original cleavage: rather the cleavage was 
reinforced as the polity deradicalised. Deradicalisation was 
not the result of the familiar steps: the abandonment of 
nationalist goals, the replacement of radical actors with 
moderate ones, or changes in the external environment 
which made nationalist issues less relevant. The Irish mar-
ketplace of ideas was actually severely distorted by the al-
liance between priest and patriot: exactly the conditions 
under which elections allegedly lead to radicalisation 
(Snyder 2000, 56–59). Elites were accountable electorally, 
but not in other ways. Nonetheless, elections proved a suf-
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within six months. The Provisional Government, under 
pressure from the British, saw this election as a means of 
finding out if the people would give them a mandate for 
the course they were taking. The anti-treatyites feared it 
would signify the disestablishment of the Republic and an 
acceptance of partition (Kissane 2002). An election was 
held only on June 16 after both sides agreed to put forward 
a joint panel of candidates and form a Sinn Féin coalition 
government afterwards. This agreement became known as 
“the Collins-de Valera electoral pact”. In the June election 
pro-treaty panel candidates won 58 seats out of 128, while 
anti-treatyites from this panel got 36, a loss of 22 seats.
The assumption of the electoral pact, that a straight vote 
on the treaty be avoided, was now rejected in favour of the 
arbitration device. The Provisional Government thought 
the results gave them a clear mandate to implement the 
treaty. Republicans thought the mandate was for a coali-
tion. To the case for the Treaty settlement, only narrowly 
accepted by the Dáil in January 1922, was added the prin-
ciple that the majority must rule. A switch to peacetime 
legitimacy was underway, and the alleged threat to individ-
ual liberty and private property posed by the “irregular” 
IRA was now stressed in government propaganda (Kissane 
2005, 155–58). The Provisional Government, under British 
pressure, attacked the IRA positions in central Dublin on 
June 28. Civil war then spread to the countryside. The 
fighting was ultimately one-sided, the public proved war-
weary, and the anti-treatyites laid down their arms and re-
turned home without a surrender in May 1923 (Hopkinson 
1988). Military victory was secured.
The logic of an arbitration device was that the electoral vic-
tors would determine the direction of the polity, and gov-
ernment policy reflect public opinion. The government 
claimed that the August 1923 election retrospectively vindi-
cated its civil war policy. Yet Michael Collins, the pro-treaty 
leader, also said that the treaty would stand, unless “in the 
whirl of politics” those opposed to it got a majority in the 
country (Kissane 2002, 207). The arbitration mechanism 
thus pointed to two means of conflict resolution. The vic-
tors tried to use their strength to compel the losers to accept 
the settlement. In contrast, Fianna Fáil wanted to reconcile 
the losers to the new state by replacing the agreement.
Implicit in the arbitration device is the principle of major-
ity rule. When the anti-treatyites offered to negotiate peace 
in April 1923, the government replied that in future, “all 
political issues … shall be decided by the majority vote of 
the elected representatives of the people” (Valiulis 1992, 
189). At the Sinn Féin Árd Fheis (general convention) in 
1926, when a large minority left to form Fianna Fáil, Sinn 
Féin’s president de Valera declared that “the majority of the 
people were going to shape the future” (Fanning 1989, 10). 
The pro-treaty government stood down after the 1932 elec-
tions, from which Fianna Fáil emerged as the largest party. 
After gaining a majority of seats in 1933, de Valera grad-
ually revised the treaty on the basis of his parliamentary 
majority. His enactment of a Republican constitution in 
1937 “completed the reconciliation of majority rule with 
popular sovereignty” (Farrell 1988, 117–19).
By 1938, (besides partition) most civil war issues had been 
substantially resolved by the arbitration device. This en-
couraged deradicalisation in two ways. Responsibility for 
deciding the direction of the polity was devolved, which 
meant that the moves away from the treaty were in step 
with a public opinion less radical than the elite. Secondly, 
those parties that accepted the arbitration device found 
themselves at odds with radical actors. The anti-treatyites 
were seen to have rejected democracy in 1922, and Fianna 
Fáil had to resolve its “commitment problem” by signalling 
its moderate intentions after 1926. The assassination of the 
Minister of Home Affairs, Kevin O’Higgins on 10 July, 
1927, saw them end their abstentionist policy and enter the 
Dáil. Before the 1932 election, rather than declaring that 
once in power they would dissolve all existing relationships 
with the United Kingdom, Fianna Fáil limited their am-
bitions to the removal of the oath (required of parliamen-
tarians by the 1922 constitution), combined with the 
non-payment of land annuities to the British government. 
(Land annuities were paid by Irish farmers as com-
pensation for land they gained from various land reform 
acts before independence.) These commitments ensured 
Fianna Fáil Labour’s support in power. Nonetheless, the 
IRA informally worked for Fianna Fáil in elections in 1932 
and 1933., Only Fianna Fáil’s electoral victory in 1933 saw 
them finally resolve their commitment problem by em-
ploying military tribunals against the IRA. These tribunals 
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had been established by Cumann na nGaedheal in 1931. 
After this extra-legal opposition to the Fianna Fáil govern-
ment subsided.
3.2. Elections as a Coordinating Mechanism
If civil war ends in stalemate and an agreement to share 
power, both sides may deradicalise concurrently. Yet in Ire-
land there was a direct connection between the imbalance 
of power created by the civil war and the loser’s decision to 
deradicalise. An effective coordination device establishes 
clear expectations about actors’ compliance with its provi-
sions, forcing them to re-assess their attitudes to it or be-
come marginalised (Hardin 1999, 140). In Ireland the 
prospect of political oblivion quickly led to deradical-
isation. The civil war victors insisted on elections as the 
only route to power. The anti-treatyites could reorganise 
knowing that their opponents would respect the integrity 
of this procedure. Expectations converged around parlia-
ment as the only place for opposition.
The government had won the war “hands down”. The 
losers abstained from the Dáil, and hoped for an election 
victory which would enable Sinn Féin’s parliament and 
government to become the institutions of the state. Yet 
local government appointments were centrally controlled, 
the losers were excluded from public employment, and 
many emigrated. Financial problems and electoral failures 
forced Sinn Fein to reconsider tactics (Pyne 1969–70). The 
danger of a genuine multi-party system was very obvious 
to de Valera, who remarked in 1923 that if the “third par-
ties” (such as Labour) succeeded in organising themselves 
to any considerable extent it would be nearly impossible to 
unite them again “for a purely national purpose”. It was 
vital, therefore, that the reorganisation of Sinn Féin as the 
national organisation should be pushed forward with all 
speed (Laffan 1999, 429).
In January 1926 de Valera announced his willingness to 
enter the Dáil if the oath of allegiance were removed. The 
issue was debated by Sinn Féin on 9 March, 1926. Having 
lost the debate, de Valera’s minority became Fianna Fáil: 
the Republican Party, further splintering Sinn Féin with 
another split. The public rewarded their step towards de-
radicalisation. In June 1927 Fianna Fáil gained forty-four 
as opposed to Cumann na nGaedheal’s forty-seven seats, 
but its elected members were prevented from taking their 
seats so as long as they refused to take the oath. The as-
sassination of Kevin O’Higgins then led the government to 
introduce a bill requiring electoral candidates to promise in 
advance to comply with the oath. The basis of the ab-
stentionist policy was destroyed. Fianna Fáil took the oath 
– albeit as “an empty political formula” – and became the 
largest opposition party. When the “Republican Dáil” met 
on December 11, 1927, only half of those who had at-
tended the previous year were invited, as the other half had 
joined the de facto parliament (Kissane 2002, 173–80).
Post-conflict democracies can be sustained by uncertainty: 
actors can accept electoral defeat for now, confident of fu-
ture chances (Prezoworski 1988). In Ireland, certainty 
about their future irrelevance if they continued their policy 
of abstentionism encouraged the losers’ participation in of-
ficial institutions. An imbalance of power had similar con-
sequences in 1933, when the newly-formed Fine Gael (a 
continuation of Cumann na nGaedheal) chose an un-
elected fascist with a civil war past as its president, and a 
campaign of political disruption by his “Blueshirts” began. 
“Red-scare” tactics against Fianna Fáil marked the 1933 
election and paramilitary violence returned to the country-
side. The Blueshirts were led by fascists, but the Fine Gael 
parliamentary elite abandoned them when the situation 
polarised. The government repressed them with the co-
operation of the Garda Síochána (police). The poor show-
ing of Blueshirt candidates in the 1934 local elections 
suggested their movement, and the crisis it provoked, 
would be “the nemesis of civil war”. If Fianna Fáil had not 
won an electoral majority in 1933, Fine Gael (and the Brit-
ish government, with whom Fianna Fáil fought a trade 
war), may have tried harder to undermine its government. 
De Valera had called the snap election believing that the 
British government would not negotiate with a parliament 
they expected to fall (Fanning 1983). The pro-treaty elite 
confined themselves to conventional opposition from then 
on. An imbalance of power again saw expectations con-
verging on parliament as the arena of political opposition.
Stable democracy has, as a core element, political con-
sensus on the desirability of existing institutions and the 
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rules of the game. Historically, such elite consensus has 
come about either through elite settlements, or through 
processes of electoral competition in which the main par-
ties eventually converge on an equilibrium point (Higley 
and Burton 1998). Although the civil war destroyed the 
basis for consensus for some time, the parties converged on 
some issues in the late 1930s, culminating in an agreed pol-
icy of neutrality in World War Two. Elections encouraged 
this convergence at two critical turning-points. Fianna Fáil 
became a responsible opposition in 1927 as the world de-
pression was deepening. Fine Gael accepted the legitimacy 
of Fianna Fáil rule in 1934, when the European polar-
isation between democrats and fascists was extending to 
Ireland. Both crises saw expectations coordinate on parlia-
mentary forms of opposition.
 3.3. Elections as a Selection Mechanism.
In the absence of strong mechanisms of accountability 
elections can be hijacked by an elite threatened by the re-
turn to normal politics. Yet Irish elections did not provide 
“a safe landing” for nationalist elites (Mansfield and Snyder 
2005 8): after all mechanisms of accountability had been 
sufficiently strong to make radical arguments unpersuasive 
in 1922 (Garvin 1996). Elections also remained com-
petitive, giving the edge to those who could adapt their skill 
sets and rationalise their commitment to them after the 
civil war. Elections institute a double process of “Darwi-
nian selectivity” in favour of such actors: one among par-
ties in general elections, and one among politicians vying 
for leadership within these parties (Rustow 1970, 359). The 
danger was that hardliners would regroup and use civil war 
networks to continue the conflict by other means. Yet in 
Ireland early elections had the opposite effect, forcing splits 
within Sinn Féin in 1922 and 1926. The losses of anti-
treaty Sinn Féin in the “pact election” of 1922, and the 
public’s rejection of key anti-treaty leaders, led to the pro-
treaty leader, William Cosgrave, refusing negotiations dur-
ing the civil war with people whose “period of usefulness” 
had been eclipsed (Kissane 2005). Into the 1930s elections 
continued to give actors more suited to peaceful politics 
the upper hand within the anti-treaty opposition.
The impact of this double selectivity on the party system 
has been noted. It resulted in the marginalisation of Sinn 
Féin after 1926 and of the Blueshirts after 1933. Anti-treaty 
losses in 1922, strong support for third parties up to 1927, 
and the fear that they would realign the system around 
non-nationalist issues, all encouraged deradicalisation. Re-
publicanism had to become electorally competitive to 
achieve its goals. Moreover, the victors’ “red-scare” propa-
ganda continually stressed the responsibility of the anti-
treatyites for the economic cost of the civil war. This had 
two consequences: first, Fianna Fáil had to focus on econ-
omic issues in elections; then, in order to show coalition 
potential, the party deradicalised its behaviour in the Dáil. 
The prospect of it coming to power after its five years as a 
constructive opposition was less threatening. Labour, 
which supported the government during the civil war, sup-
ported the minority Fianna Fáil government between 1932 
and 1933.
This selectivity was also at work in the struggle for hegem-
ony within Sinn Féin. While the struggle between revol-
utionary and conservative nationalists among the victors 
continued within the army, on the losing side those who 
were successful in elections became “norm entrepreneurs” 
for democratic methods. This struggle went through three 
phases: the initial response to defeat, the 1926 split, and 
Fianna Fáil’s period in power. In 1923 de Valera reflected 
that the absence of popular support was his side’s chief 
weakness during the civil war. He saw in the government’s 
formation of Cumann na nGaedheal an opportunity to re-
launch Sinn Féin as a broad-based national movement. At-
tempts to have the party rename itself the Irish Republican 
Political Organisation were resisted by de Valera, who in-
sisted that “we wish to organise not merely Republican 
opinion strictly so-called, but what might be called 
‘Nationalist’ or ‘Independence’ opinion in general”. De 
Valera, who had explicitly rejected the arbitration device in 
1922, became “a norm entrepreneur” for democratic 
methods (Kissane 2002, 168–73).
Yet stalemate first prevailed. In 1925 the IRA decided it 
would withdraw its allegiance to the Republican govern-
ment founded by de Valera in 1922. This contributed to the 
formation of Fianna Fáil, and after its entry into the Dáil 
the balance of power shifted. Sinn Féin was only able to put 
forward fifteen candidates for the June 1927 election, as 
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 41 – 54
Bill Kissane: Elections as a Mechanism of Deradicalisation 50
opposed to Fianna Fáil’s eighty-seven, and only five were 
elected. Sinn Féin was unable to put forward any candi-
dates at all for the election in September 1927. In contrast, 
Fianna Fáil increased its seats from forty-four to fifty-
seven. The number of affiliated Sinn Féin branches (Cu-
mainn) was 87 in 1927 compared to a figure of 232 for 
1926 (Kissane 2002, 175). Many Sinn Féin members and 
supporters who initially remained loyal, later joined Fianna 
Fáil, “attracted by its dynamism and the political acumen 
of its leaders” (Pyne 1969, 47).
A third phase began in 1933. Even though many IRA 
members worked for Fianna Fáil in the 1932 and 1933 elec-
tions, Fianna Fáil’s government did not suspend Article 2A, 
which allowed for military tribunals, although their oper-
ations were halted. The hated Criminal Intelligence De-
partment, responsible for counter-insurgency, remained in 
existence. Moreover, a former Cumann na nGaedhealer 
was chosen as Minister of Justice. Open confrontation with 
the IRA followed a radical change in IRA policy in March 
1933, when the IRA rescinded its resolution, carried in 
1932, to adopt a supportive attitude towards the govern-
ment. It would now “pursue its policy irrespective of its 
reactions on the policy of the Free State Government and 
other political parties” (Kissane 2002, 184).
Fianna Fáil wanted not to marginalise Republicanism, but 
to show those bitter in defeat that politics could achieve 
their objectives. The Constitution (Removal of Oath) Actin 
1933 went some way towards fulfilling the government’s 
ambition of establishing a government based on demo-
cratic principles, “and the complete absence of political 
barriers or tests of conscience of any kind” (Kissane 2002, 
187). Government pensions were introduced for members 
of the anti-treaty IRA, and IRA men were recruited into the 
Gardaí. The 1937 constitution made it difficult to claim 
that the state was not legitimate. The changed attitude of 
one IRA leader, Sean MacBride, is illustrative. In the early 
thirties he predicted that if Fianna Fáil succeeded in re-
moving the oath and the office of Governor General, the 
IRA would be in a difficult position (ibid., 192). By 1937 he 
had become convinced that the IRA had no real role to play 
in Southern politics, and ceased to be active in the organi-
sation soon thereafter.
Since the decision of the more pragmatic Sinn Féiners to 
accept the treaty involved a commitment to deradicalise, 
the selection mechanism mattered most for those with the 
longest journey to travel. It worked so effectively that Fian-
na Fáil developed the most efficient electoral machine in 
the state, remaining dominant until 2011. Its electoral jour-
ney began in defeat, and its organisational culture was al-
ready apparent from de Valera’s attempted reorganisation 
of Sinn Féin in 1923; ideological pragmatism combined 
with Republican rhetoric; a concentration on socio-
economic issues; and electoral efficiency – an internal 
memo stated that there should be no “duds” in this regard, 
but appointment by ability (Kissane 2002, 193). Before 
1932 such norm entrepreneurs required electoral successes 
to be persuasive. In power they vindicated their civil war 
cause with constitutional changes, and at the same time 
pushed aside the IRA. “Constitutional Republicanism” may 
be an oxymoron, and only success at the polls allowed Re-
publicanism, south of the border, to become constitutional.
4. Elections and State-Building
A tension can exist between elections and state-building, 
and for this reason Paris recommends “institutionalisation 
before liberalisation” (2004, 179–211) . Early elections can 
freeze allegiances in ways that are incompatible with state-
building, which requires integration among the population 
(Sisk 2009, 198–203). Yet the Irish sequence was simulta-
neous institutionalisation and liberalisation. By 1922 the 
country was in chaos, with no official security force. Only 
civil war resolved the problems of dual authority struc-
tures, private armies, rival sovereignty claims, and disputed 
boundaries. Central institutions were then rapidly recon-
structed between 1923 and 1927, years in which four gen-
eral elections took place.
Early elections rubber-stamped this process of recon-
struction. The Provisional Government’s claim that it re-
ceived a mandate in 1922 would have been hard to sustain 
had they not won the conventional phase of the civil war 
by September. The August 1923 election was held before 
the civil war had officially ended, and enabled the govern-
ment to claim public endorsement for its military cam-
paign. Later elections (in 1927, 1933, and 1938), were also 
followed by emergency legislation. The public rewarded the 
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elite with a mandate for the course (deradicalisation) they 
were taking. Indeed all but one of the eight elections held 
between 1922 and 1938 were won by incumbents. If the 
public was receptive to deradicalisation in the interests of 
democracy, it consistently showed a preference for strong 
central authority. There was no trade-off between liberali-
sation and institutionalisation.
Elections also confirmed that the state had not been cap-
tured by the winners. An electoral reform that did not dis-
advantage the losers was carried out in 1923. The retention 
of proportional representation (STV) allowed them to 
rapidly regain electoral ground. Garvin suggests that the 
pro-treaty elite saw politics “essentially as administration”, 
and reacted to the disturbance of revolution by committing 
themselves to a state autonomous from a “corrupting” 
native culture (Garvin 1981). After 1932 Fianna Fáil sought 
no revenge, and made the state more autonomous. While 
previous reconstruction schemes offered employment to 
National Army veterans, Fianna Fáil offered it to all.
The state itself was a source of deradicalisation. Early elec-
tions signalled that this process was underway, and state 
strength kept these signals strong. Had elections been post-
poned, the state would have lacked legitimacy, and the 
losers would have been deprived of a reason to regroup. 
Eight general elections took place between 1922 and 1938: 
one every few years. Since power was usually returned to 
incumbents, public support for deradicalisation was ob-
viously connected to state performance. Elections fur-
thered institutionalisation because they reinforced 
traditional conceptions of state performance. By 1922 an 
idea of the state existed: the government’s civil war propa-
ganda stressed the state’s role in the protection of individ-
ual liberty and private property (Kissane 2005, 151). 
Fianna Fáil incorporated aspects of Cumann na nGaed-
heal’s appeal into its own strategy, as demonstrated in its 
manifesto for the 1933 general election.
Fianna Fáil 1933 General Election Manifesto
Today!
 Choose your own Government
 Choose a Strong Government
 Choose an Irish Government!
We pledge ourselves to promote unity, to rule justly and impartially, 
to hold all citizens equal before the law, and to protect each in his 
person and in his property with all the resources at our command. 
We promise that the confidence placed in us by the people will not 
be abused. We promise to serve Ireland with all our abilities and to 
advance in every way the true interests of her people.
 (Signed President de Valera).
Vote Fianna Fáil
Security was the bedrock of the state-society relationship 
(Sisk 2009), and the issue most likely to lead voters to sup-
port the government after civil war, regardless of social 
cleavages (Wantchekon 2005). The emphasis of the British 
state had also been on security. Mulhall notes that ex-
penditure on the secret service was vastly higher after inde-
pendence than it had been under the British in 1921–22. 
Expenditure on the police, for example, rose from £425,000 
in 1922–23 to £1,031,000 in 1923 (Mulhall 1993). The gov-
ernment’s “red-scare” tactics, effective in the civil war, con-
tinued into the 1930s. This forced Fianna Fáil to address 
the public’s need for security too. As de Valera recalled:
The people supported Fianna Fáil because its policy was a practi-
cal one. It kept the ultimate objective of a free, united Irish na-
tion clearly in view, but it concentrated successively on the nea-
rer local objectives along the way, striving at each point to put 
upon the people only the strains which the people could bear. 
(quoted in Kissane 2002, 191)
Civil war issues were revisited at election time, and in the 
atmosphere of insecurity this created, those who could pro-
vide strong government benefited. The result was that com-
petition, while intense at the elite level, was deradicalising 
at the societal level. The dominance of such a conservative 
elite was reassuring to those among the public who were 
also socially conservative. The stress on security implied ac-
ceptance of the social order at a time when European 
politics were becoming polarised. Its bases, land reform, 
Catholic morality, and the common law system, had also 
been promoted by the British state, and reconstruction ef-
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forts worked through institutions, like the Land Commis-
sion, which predated independence. The state-society 
relations were reassuring in the sense of being traditional.
Snyder suggests a zero-sum relationship between the inter-
ests of nationalist elites and democratic accountability 
(2000, 52). However, as with the emphasis on security, the 
majority rule principle was mutually reassuring to elite and 
public. In 1936 de Valera published a pamphlet National 
Discipline and Majority Rule, which distanced his party from 
the civil war and suggested that the IRA had only been legit-
imate when supported by the majority of the people. He was 
now claiming the mandate he had enjoyed in 1918. Majority 
rule meant that the civil war elite remained dominant, in re-
turn for which the elite provided the public with the sense 
of security that had been disrupted since 1914. Elections 
were crucial to this balancing act. When governments with 
weak parliamentary bases held snap elections at two critical 
junctures (September 1927 and 1933), crises of authority 
were resolved with the public’s support. Such elections 
forced the public to choose between one or other of the civil 
war sides who favoured an arbitration device that privileged 
their own conception of politics. Deradicalisation was thus a 
joint exercise, not one where either elite or public prevailed. 
Irish elites were able to shape governing alternatives, while 
becoming more responsive to public preferences.
The horizontal aspect to the state-society relations was im-
portant too. As issues became resolved by the arbitration 
device, the two civil war parties converged on common 
ground. The Offences Against the State Act, passed against 
the IRA in 1939, gained their joint support, as did the 
state’s policy of neutrality in World War Two. Consensus 
on economic protectionism and on the defence of Catholic 
morality had also been established. Both civil war sides had 
originated in Sinn Féin, and unlike unionists, shared a be-
lief in full independence and Irish unity. Some personal 
friendships were revived as work in the Dáil acted as “an 
emotional solvent” for the bitterness of civil war. The elite 
had come to prominence in a national revolution, which 
disadvantaged those with no “national records”, such as 
Labour. The outcome was mutually reassuring to those 
whose nationalist politics prevailed, and to the public 
which saw the social conflicts of the civil war left behind.
Unfortunately, the price was the muffling of the pluralism 
Snyder associates with deradicalised politics. The Irish rev-
olution had had a social dimension: over one hundred So-
viets were formed between 1917 and 1923 (Kostick 2009). 
Labour did exceptionally well in 1922, but after the civil 
war its vote fell sharply. Its weakness in rural regions far 
from Dublin gave the advantage to Fianna Fáil, which took 
many of its manifesto commitments from Labour in 1927. 
Fianna Fáil continued the nineteenth-century pattern of 
standing up to Britain, but rapidly spread its support base 
beyond those peripheral areas where anti-state feeling had 
been strongest in 1923 (Garvin 1981). “Civil war politics”, 
involving competing visions of the nation’s future and the 
muffling of pluralism, could have delayed reconciliation. 
Yet Fianna Fáil’s expansion was compatible with state-
building, as such parties came to represent an en-
compassing, not exclusive, national interest. Neither Fianna 
Fáil or Fine Gael were established during the civil war.
The paradox of deradicalisation taking place alongside the 
institutionalisation of a deep cleavage has been explored re-
garding Northern Ireland, an ethnically-divided society 
(Evans, Mitchell, and O’Leary 2009). Party competition 
can, however, further national integration: (a) by establish-
ing a national network of cross-local communication chan-
nels in a way that strengthens national identity; and (b) by 
helping to set the national system of government above any 
particular set of office holders, encouraging voters to target 
their discontent at the governing party and not the political 
system as a whole (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 4). The 1932 
changeover allowed voters’ discontent to be targeted at 
Cumann na nGaedheal, not the state. Moreover, both civil 
war parties continued the nineteenth-century tradition of 
establishing mass centralised organisations which cut across 
class and territorial cleavages (Garvin 1981, 216). Neither 
were a party of periphery or centre: both emphasised social 
cohesion. Nation-building through party competition was 
one consequence of civil war politics. As with older 
nationalist movements, these parties also provided in-
stitutions within which the rivalry between constitutional 
and violent nationalism could be bridged (ibid., 180).
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5. Conclusion
The Irish nationalist elite was only relatively autonomous: 
they remained electorally dominant, but the steps they 
took on the treaty were in line with public opinion. The 
Mansfield/Snyder perspective reflects the pre-1914 liberal 
view of the public as “a molten mass” that elites can easily 
put their stamp on (Müller 2011, 7). Yet Irish elections 
combined two things Snyder does not allow for. They de-
radicalised politics and kept a nationalist elite, schooled in 
constitutional and revolutionary politics, in power. Since 
the formation of a cohesive elite is required for societies to 
move out of transition, elections mattered not in making 
this elite accountable, but giving it the ability to rule. Civil 
war politics perpetuated the struggle for legitimacy, but 
keeping that struggle sharp favoured not moderates, but 
those who combined constitutional politics with a revol-
utionary pedigree.
Irish elections only became part of an effective system of 
checks and balances after the passing of the 1937 con-
stitution. They mattered most as conduits of public 
opinion in a society with a long tradition of local political 
organisation. Most Irish politicians had “dual mandates” 
(i.e., held local government and parliamentary seats) and 
local elections were held in 1925, 1928, and 1934. Anti-
treatyites never abstained from these bodies, many of 
which passed peace resolutions during the civil war, but 
were not generally responsible for national issues. That 
local support was required for national power provided a 
key mechanism of deradicalisation, and points to the need 
to investigate voters’ preferences at the local level before as-
suming that elections held in transitional circumstances 
will radicalise politics. Such an investigation would direct 
attention to that combination of war weariness, govern-
ment repression, economic interests, mass emigration, re-
ligious authority, and cultural traditions that made these 
constituencies elect not to fight. Their articulation through 
the STV proportional representation system was also con-
stant before and after the civil war.
For Mansfield and Snyder elections could have deradical-
ised because they were held after central institutions had 
developed (the sequence argument), were complimented 
by strong checks and balances (the accountability ar-
gument), or because the time that elapsed before 1937 was 
sufficient for behaviour to change incrementally (the state-
building argument). None of these perspectives explains 
the outcome in Ireland, where institutionalisation and lib-
eralisation were mutually reinforcing, despite the frequency 
of elections in this period. The complementary relation-
ship between elections and state-building was crucial to the 
resolution of the civil war divide. Once the Free State had 
shown its strength, the question was how it could accom-
modate change by making credible the “stepping-stone” 
approach to the Treaty. The losers had to show they could 
reconcile changes to the Treaty with stability. Elections 
helped establish credibility in both respects. That they did 
so without altering the state-society relationship suggests 
that deradicalisation was dependent on state performance, 
and thus on some shared conception of the state. In ex-
plaining why the currency of revolutionary politics could 
be converted into a state-building project through elections 
– the gold standard of deradicalisation in Ireland – the idea 
of the state was as important as its institutional design.
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